一、系列讲座日程
第86期：
主讲人：Yiming Qian
题 目：Can firms run away from climate-change risk? Evidence from the pricing of bank loans
时 间：2020年6月24日星期三，20:30-22:00（北京时间）
主持人：顾弦副教授
第87期：
主讲人：林则君（Tse-Chun Lin）
题 目：Firm Trustworthiness and Bank Loan Pricing
时 间：2020年7月1日星期三，上午10:00-11:30（北京时间）
主持人：黄瑜琴副教授，应用金融系主任
第88期：
主讲人：Yiming Qian
题 目：Initial public offerings Chinese style
时 间：2020年7月8日星期三，20:30-22:00（北京时间）
主持人：顾弦副教授
第89期：
主讲人：林则君（Tse-Chun Lin）
题 目：Behavioral consistency in SEOs and M&As: Evidence from CEO anchoring heuristic
时 间：2020年7月15日星期三，上午10:00-11:30（北京时间）
主持人：黄瑜琴副教授，应用金融系主任
二、会议形式与地点
腾讯会议【具体房间临时通知】
三、主讲嘉宾简介
Yiming Qian，美国康涅狄格大学 Toscano Family 金融学讲席教授。她在纽约大学Stern商学院获得金融学博士学位。主要研究领域为公司金融，包括IPO、并购与重组、行为金融和新兴市场等方向。其学术论文曾发表于许多国际顶尖学术期刊，包括Journal of Financial Economics，the Review of Financial Studies，Management Science，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Review of Finance等。
林则君（Tse-Chun Lin），香港大学经济及工商管理学院金融学教授。本科毕业于台湾大学，丁伯根经济研究所（Tinbergen Institute）硕士，荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学博士。他的研究领域为行为金融学，曾在American Economic Review, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance等杂志发表高水平论文十多篇，《经济学人》、《华尔街日报》、《彭博》、《投资》等杂志也对他的研究进行了专题报道，是该领域非常有影响的经济学家。他担任了Financial Mangement 的Associate Editor, 以及Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、Review of Finance、Financial Management、Journal of Banking and Finance、Journal of Empirical Finance等多个杂志的评审人。
四、讲座论文摘要
Can firms run away from climate-change risk? Evidence from the pricing of bank loans
We examine whether climate-change risk affects firms’ cost of capital when firms can adapt to the risk. We find firms’ cost of long-term loans increases with sea level rise (SLR) risk, but this effect mainly holds among firms with high adjustment costs to the risk, i.e., firms for whom it is hard to relocate or otherwise diversify SLR risk. Moreover, the spread-risk sensitivity is higher if the bank has more experience with the risk and in times of heightened media attention. This suggests banks have limited attention to this unconventional risk. Finally, affected firms respond by using less long-term debt.
Initial public offerings Chinese style
We examine various aspects of the IPO market in China—the policy history, IPO pricing, bid and allocation, and post-market trading. We examine these issues under two lenses: IPO theories and the unique regulatory environment in China. We show that heavy-handed regulations cause inefficient IPO offer prices and excessive initial returns. Investors treat IPOs as lotteries with extreme short-term returns, with little incentives for long-term investment. The auction selling method, however, works as it should be. Mutual funds bid more smartly than other investors, and their advantages are unlikely due to underwriters’ preferential treatments. Finally, we also discuss the direction of future regulation reforms (including the latest science and technology board, or STAR market).
Firm Trustworthiness and Bank Loan Pricing
Using a novel dataset of firm-level perceived trustworthiness from the news media and social media, we find that lending banks charge significantly higher loan spread on firms with lower trustworthiness. Loans to these firms also tend to have shorter loan maturities, more financial covenants, and higher likelihoods of requiring collateral. We further use the Regulation SHO Pilot program as an exogenous variation and find that the effects of trustworthiness are reduced when pilot firms are better disciplined by short sellers. That is, banks rely less on soft information like trustworthiness when the overall information and governance environments regarding the borrowing firms are improved. Last, firm trustworthiness effects are stronger for firms with high corruption culture, weak corporate governance, and higher information asymmetry. Collectively, our results suggest that perceived firm trustworthiness from the stakeholders conveys valuable credit quality information to bank loan lenders.
Behavioral consistency in SEOs and M&As: Evidence from CEO anchoring heuristic
We examine whether CEOs carry anchoring heuristic in personal decision-making over to corporate decisions. We first show that CEOs tend to anchor on the 52-week high stock price for insider selling and then identify the “anchoring CEOs.” Firms with anchoring CEOs are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings when stock prices approach the 52-week high. Moreover, for mergers and acquisitions deals by anchoring bidder CEOs, offer premium increases more with the target’s 52-week high stock price. The results are more pronounced for situations with higher valuation uncertainty. Overall, anchoring CEOs behave consistently across personal and professional situations.
五、支持机构与项目
中央财经大学引智项目
金融学院学术交流部
金融学院应用金融系
金融学院金融科技系
