Journal of Financial Markets, Volume 31, November 2016, Pages 81–126

IPO相关的投资者诉讼的决定因素——CEO股权激励和公司治理的影响

作者：Xingli Lia (Sunlife Everbright Insurance, China), Kuntara Pukthuanthongb (University of Missouri, USA), Marcus Glenn Walkerc (Fin-Consult, Germany), Thomas John Walkerd (Concordia University, Canada)

摘要：我们考察首次公开募股公司的激励与治理机制，探究其如何影响证券欺诈及相关的投资者诉讼的发生。以前的研究主要关注增发股份的公司，而我们研究CEO激励与IPO过程中的公司治理对IPO相关的投资者诉讼发生率的影响。结果显示证券欺诈诉讼发生的概率会随着IPO前CEO的股权激励而增加，表明管理层股权激励存在“暗箱”。对于董事会被内部人员控制，CEO年龄更大、任期更短，或者CEO创立的公司，被起诉的风险更高。

关键词：首次公开募股；CEO股权激励；公司治理

The determinants of IPO-related shareholder litigation: The role of CEO equity incentives and corporate governance

Xingli Lia (Sunlife Everbright Insurance, China), Kuntara Pukthuanthongb (University of Missouri, USA), Marcus Glenn Walkerc (Fin-Consult, Germany), Thomas John Walkerd (Concordia University, Canada)

ABSTRACT

We examine how compensation and corporate governance mechanisms affect the occurrence of securities fraud and related shareholder litigation for initial public offering (IPO) firms. While prior research has focused on seasoned firms, we examine how CEO incentives and corporate governance in IPOs affect the incidence of IPO-related shareholder litigation. We find that the likelihood of securities fraud allegations increases with pre-IPO CEO equity incentives, suggesting a “dark side” to executive equity incentives. The risk of being sued is higher for firms whose boards are dominated by insiders, whose CEOs are older, have shorter tenure, or who founded the firm.

Keywords：Initial public offerings; CEO equity incentives; Corporate governance

原文链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1386418116302178

翻译：黄怡文