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倪骁然| Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

[发布日期]:2017-03-13  [浏览次数]:

倪骁然| 193期双周学术论坛:Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

一、主题:Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

二、主讲人:倪骁然,清华大学经济管理学院金融系博士研究生。本科毕业于清华大学。主要研究领域为公司治理和中国资本市场。研究成果曾在Economics Letters、《管理世界》、《经济学(季刊)》等国内外刊物发表。

三、时间:2017年3月15日(周三),12:30-13:30

四、地点:学院南路校区主教学楼910会议室

五、主持人:黄志刚,中央财经大学金融学院副教授

Abstract: Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as exogenous shocks to filing derivative lawsuits, we find that weakened shareholder litigation rights cause a significant increase in the cost of debt. Further analyses indicate this relation is largely driven by heightened managerial risk-taking. Shareholders respond to these changes by providing managers with less risk-taking incentives. Overall, our findings suggest that the shareholder litigation rights are important to debtholders.



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