由我院李建军教授与国内外几位学者合作完成的论文《Systemic Risk in the Chinese Shadow Banking System: A Sector-Level Perspective》发表在《Emerging Markets Finance & Trade》2016年2月第52卷上。本文是国家自然科学基金项目《货币政策约束下中国影子信贷市场融资搜寻模型》的部分研究成果。本文的主要内容和观点是：

The issue of “shadow banking” has received a lot of attention since the subprime crisis in 2007 and it has been considered as a main source of financial instability. There is widespread international agreement on the need to better understand how shadow banking intersects with regular banking system and how to measure risk in shadow banking. This paper proposed a framework to measure the risk in Chinese shadow banking on sector level to test risk. The paper argued that Chinese shadow banking sectors include commercial banks, trust companies, securities companies, fund companies, insurance companies micro- loan companies and P2P platforms. Then the meaning of local risk and systemic risk was explained respectively. Local risk was considered as a kind of risk which accumulates and breaks out in just one sector while systemic risk was considered as a kind of risk that can transfer from one sector to another sector and harm the whole system eventually. To measure the risk in Chinese shadow banking system, we devised a local risk index and built a systemic risk model on the basis of network model.

We propose to measure the systemic risk in the shadow banking sector. Instead of testing how many institutions will fail due to the initial breakdown of one institution as extant network models do, we associate the systemic risk of one shadow banking sector with the total amount of unexpected losses it might generate both directly and indirectly. Our model focuses on balance sheet contagion and applies a loop algorithm to risk transfer. The result shows that trust companies were the main culprit of financial instability and commercial banks assumed the main risks in the Chinese shadow banking system. The shadow banking system was relatively stable in the second and third quarter. The stability was weaker in the first quarter and it was weakest in the fourth quarter.

To control systemic risk in the Chinese shadow banking, financial leverage of shadow banking institutions should be controlled. Commercial banks bypass regulatory policies of adequacy rate and reserve deposit ratio by making off-balance transactions. To effectively reduce leverage, table processing of related off-balance transactions should be performed. Because trust companies suffered from capital inadequacy in recent years, we call for more effective net capital regulations on trust companies. Because diversified cooperation among shadow banking sectors tends to disperse risks, innovations in shadow banking to conduct cooperative business should not be prohibited. In addition, an emergency plan for shadow banking systematic risk is necessary to inject liquidity or to rebuild market confidence.