一、主题：Controlling Shareholder Pledging: Its Nature and Economic Consequences
二、主讲人：罗妍，复旦大学管理学院财务金融系副教授、博士生导师。2010年获得香港大学金融学博士。研究领域包括行为金融、公司财务、资产定价、中国资本市场特殊问题等，在Management Science、Reviewof Accounting Studies、Journal of Corporate Finance、Journalof Banking and Finance、Journal of Accounting,Auditing, and Finance等国际期刊发表多篇论文。主持国家自然科学基金、上海市晨光计划、上海市浦江人才计划等十多项纵向及横向课题。担任SSCI期刊Research in International Business and Finance副主编、十余本SSCI期刊匿名评审、国家自然科学基金通讯评审、香港研究资助局(RGC)研究基金外部评审等。
Abstract: This paper examines the economic consequences of controlling shareholder pledging in the Chinese A-share market conditional on the nature of the pledging. We decompose controlling shareholder pledging into expected and unexpected components. The former can be inferred from firm characteristics, whereas the latter captures the pure effect of the pledging behavior. Both expected and unexpected pledging add to firms’ future crash risk, while only unexpected pledging contributes to firm financial constraints in the short-term. Furthermore, we collect pledging purpose and classify them into three groups: firm operations and investments, pledge supplements, and personal use. The negative effects of pledging are weak among pledges for the purpose of firm operations and investments but strong among those for the purpose of personal use. The evidence suggests that the nature of pledging, as suggested by its expected and unexpected components as well as pledging purposes, plays an important role in influencing the economic consequences of controlling shareholder pledging.